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Abstract
This paper gives the e!ect of side-information, obtained by the opponent through an initial
reconciliation step, on the size of the secret-key that can be distilled safely by subsequent privacy
ampli7cation in unconditionally secure secret-key agreement protocol based on smooth entropy,
and obtains the size of the secret-key.
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1. Introduction
The security of many presently used cryptosystems, for example all public-key cryp-
tographic schemes, is based on the assumed hardness of computational problems in
number theory such as the integer-factoring problem or the problem of computing
discrete logarithms in certain 7nite cyclic groups. Such a cryptosystem is called com-
putationally secure.
Practical computational security is always conditional and additionally faces the risk
of being broken by progress in the theory of e<cient algorithms or in hardware en-
gineering. On the other hand, it appears desirable from both a scienti7c and practical
point of view to design a cryptosystem whose security is not based on any assumptions
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and can be proven rigorously. So, such security proofs must be based on information
theory rather than complexity theory.
Unconditionally secure secret-key agreement [1–4,6] takes place in a scenario where
Alice, Bob, and an adversary, Eve, know the correlated random variable X; Y , and Z ,
respectively, distributed according to some joint probability distribution that may be
under the partial control of Eve. It is possible for Alice and Bob to agree a secret-key
over an authentic public channel even when Eve’s channel is superior to Alice’s and
Bob’s channel. The system can usually be divided into three phases:
Advantage distillation: This phase is needed when neither Alice nor Bob has an
advantage over Eve, i.e., neither I(X ;Y )¿I(X ;Z) nor I(Y ;X )¿I(Y ;Z). After this
phase, a sequence of messages is summarized in a random variable C. Alice can
compute a string W from X and C about which Bob has less uncertainty than Eve:
H (W |XC) = 0 and H (W |YC)¡H (W |ZC).
Information reconciliation: Alice and Bob exchange redundant information and apply
error-correction techniques in order for Bob to be able to learn W with very high prob-
ability but such that Eve is left only with incomplete information about it. Generally,
Alice can send a bit string U whose length L is slightly larger than H (W |YC) so that
H (W |YCU ) ≈ 0, Eve’s remaining uncertainly will be H (W |ZCU )¿H (W |ZC) −
L¿ 0.
Privacy ampli8cation: Alice and Bob distill from W a shorter string K about which
Eve has only a negligible amount of information. For instance, Alice and Bob publicly
agree on a universal hash function [5] f, and choose K = f(W ) as their secret key.
Cachin [2,3] investigated privacy ampli7cation by using smooth entropy, in this
paper, we give the e!ect of side-information that Eve obtains during information
reconciliation on smooth entropy.
2. Some fundamental denitions and conclusions
We repeat some fundamental de7nitions and conclusions in this section. All loga-
rithms in this paper are to the base 2. Random variables are denoted by capital letter,
the alphabet of a random variable is denoted by the corresponding script letter, the
cardinality of a set X is denoted by |X|. The expected value of a real-valued random
variable X is denoted by E[X ].
A useful bound for any real-valued random variable X , any t ∈R+, and any r ∈R
(R is the set of real numbers ) is
P[X ¿ t]6E[e(X−r)t]:
The Shannon entropy of a random variable X with probability distribution PX and
alphabet X is de7ned as
H (X ) =−
∑
x∈X
PX (x) logPX (x):
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The conditional entropy of X conditioned on a random variable Y is
H (X |Y ) =−
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)H (X |Y = y);
where H (X |Y = y) denotes the entropy of the conditional probability distribution
PX | Y=y.
The relative entropy between two probability distributions PX ; PY with same alpha-
bet X is de7ned as D(PX ‖PY ) =
∑
x∈X PX (x) logPX (x)=PY (x). If PY is a uniform
distribution over X , then D(PX ‖PY ) = log|X | − H (X ).
The ROenyi entropy of order  of X is
H(X ) =
1
1−  log
∑
x∈X
PX (x)
for ¿ 0 and  = 1. Because the limiting case of ROenyi entropy for  → 1 is Shannon
entropy, we can extend the de7nition to H1(X ) = H (X ). In the other limiting case
 →∞, we obtain the min-entropy, de7ned as
H∞(X ) =−logmax
x∈X
PX (x):
For a 7xed random variable X , ROenyi entropy is a continuous positive decreasing
function of . For 0¡¡,
H(X )¿H(X )
with equality if and only if X is uniformly distributed over some subset of X. In
particular, log|X| ¿H(X )¿ 0 for ¿ 0 and H (X )¿H(X ) for ¿ 1.
Consider a random variable X , we want to apply a smoothing function f :X → Y
to X such that Y = f(X ) is uniformly distributed over its range Y. The largest size
of Y such that Y is still su<ciently uniform is a measure for the amount of smooth
entropy inherent in X , relative to the allowed deviation from perfect uniformity. To
quantify this deviation we use a nonuniformity measure M that associates with every
random variable X a positive number M (X ) that is 0 if and only if PX is the uniform
distribution PU(x) over X. The example for M is relative entropy D(PX ‖PU). Formally,
Denition (Cachin [2,3]). Let M be a nonuniformity measure and let  :R → R be
a decreasing nonnegative function. A random variable X with alphabet X has smooth
entropy (X ) within (s) (in terms of M) with probability 1− if (X ) is maximum
of all  such that for any security parameter s¿ 0, there exist a random variable T
and a function f :X ×T → Y with |Y | = 
2−s such that there is a failure event
E that has probability at most , and the expected value over T of the nonuniformity
M of Y = f(X; T ), given T and QE, is at most (s). Formally,
(X ) =max
 
{ | ∀s¿ 0 : ∃T; f:X ×T→ Y; |Y | = 
2 −s:
Y = f(X; T );∃E: P[E]6 ;M (Y |T QE)6(s)}:
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The principle method for extracting smooth entropy is based on universal hashing. A
universal hash function [5] is a set F of functions: A→ B such that for ∀x1; x2 ∈A
with x1 = x2, there are at most |F | = |B| function f in F such that f(x1) = f(x2).
The following two lemmas show that ROenyi entropy of order 2 and Shannon entropy
cannot di!er arbitrarily for probability distributions where pmin =minx∈X PX (x); pmax =
maxx∈X PX (x); pmin and pmax are a constant factor apart.
Lemma 1 (Cachin [2,3]). Let X be a random variable with alphabet X and distribu-
tion PX ; pmax6 cpmin, for some c¿ 1. Then
1
|X | − 1 + c6pmin6
1
|X | ;
1
|X | 6pmax6
c
|X | − 1 + c :
If the minimum and maximum probability in a distribution PX do not di!er by more
than a constant factor, then the ROenyi entropy of order 2 of X is at most a constant
below the Shannon entropy.
Lemma 2 (Cachin [2,3]). Let X; pmin ; pmax, and c are the same as Lemma 1, then
H2(X )¿H (X )− 2 log c.
The following theorem shows how smooth entropy is lower bounded by ROenyi en-
tropy of order  for any 1¡¡ 2.
Theorem 1 (Cachin [2,3]). Fix r; t ¿ 0, let m be an integer such that m − log(m +
1)¿ log|X | + t, and let s be the security parameter for smooth entropy. For any
1¡¡ 2, the smooth entropy of a random variable X within 2−s=ln 2 in terms
of relative entropy with probability 1− 2−r − 2−t is lower bounded by R;enyi entropy
of order  in the sense that (X )¿H(X )− log(m+ 1)− r=(− 1)− t − 2.
3. The eect of side-information on smooth entropy and the size of distilled secret
key
Theorem 2. Let X be a random variable with alphabet X and distribution PX ; f be
a deterministic function of X , and U =f(X ) with alphabet U. Then with probability
1− 2−r , we have
H(X )− H(X |U = u)6− logPU (u) + r− 1 (1)
for 1¡¡ 2, where r is the same as in Theorem 1.
Proof. Since f is a deterministic function of X , and U = f(X ), it follows that
H(X ) =H(XU ) =
1
1−  log
∑
x∈X;u∈U
PXU (x; u)
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=
1
1−  log
∑
u∈U
PU (u)PU (u)−1
∑
x∈X
PX |U=u(x)
=
1
1−  log
∑
y∈U
PU (u)2(−1) log PU (u)+(1−)H(X |U=u):
Interpreting H(X |U = u) as a function of u, the equation above is equivalent to∑
u∈U
PU (u)2(−1) log PU (u)+(1−)H(X |U=u) = 2(1−)H(X ) or
EU [2(−1) log PU (u)+(1−)H(X |U=u)] = 2(1−)H(X ):
Let r be the same as in Theorem 1, EU [2(−1) log PU (u)+(1−)H(X |U=u)−(1−)H(X )−r] =
2−r . In inequality P[X ¿ r]6E[e(X−r)t]; t ∈R+; r ∈R, Let t = ln 2; P[X ¿ r]6
E[2(X−r)] We have PU [(− 1) logPU (u) + (1− )H(X |U = u)− (1− )H(X )¿ r]
6 2−r or (−1) logPU (u)+(1−)H(X |U =u)− (1−)H(X )6 r with probability
at least 1− 2−r , therefore, H(X )− H(X |U = u)6− logPU (u) + r=(− 1).
Theorem 3. Let 1¡¡ 2; X; U;X;U are the same as in Theorem 2, pmin =minu∈U
PU (u), pmax =maxu∈U PU (u), and pmax6 c ·pmin for 1¡c6 3
√
2. Then for 16 6
1=
√
c3 − 1,
H(X )− H(X |U = u)6H(U )− log (1− 
√
c3 − 1) + r
− 1 (2)
with probability 1− 2−r − −2.
Proof. From H2(U ) =−log
∑
u∈U PU (u)
2 =−logE[PU (u)] and H2(U )6H(U ), we
have E[PU (u)] = 2−H2(U )6 2−H(U ),
H (U )− H3(U )6 log|U|+ 12 log
∑
u∈U
PU (u)36 log|U|+ 12 log(|U|p3max)
6 32 log|U|+ 32 logpmax
= 32 log(|U|pmax)6 32 log
(
|U| c|U| − 1 + c
)
6 32 log c :
(the fourth inequality follows from Lemma1):
H3(U )¿H (U )− 32 log c¿H(U )− 32 log c:
The variance of PU (u) is
%2PU = E[PU (u)
2]− E2[PU (u)]
=
∑
u∈U
P3U (u)−
(∑
u∈U
P2U (u)
)2
= 2−2H3(U ) − 2−2H2(U )
6 2−2H(U )+3 log c − 2−2H(U )6 2−2H(U )(c3 − 1):
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Because 1¡c6 3
√
2; 16 1=
√
c3 − 1. For 16 6 1=√c3 − 1, by Chebychef inequal-
ity, we have
P{ |PU (u)− &PU | ¡%PU }¿ 1− −2:
From |PU (u)− &PU | ¡%PU , we have
PU (u)¿ &PU − %PU ¿ 2−H(U ) − 2−H(U )
√
c3 − 1 = 2−H(U )(1− 
√
c3 − 1);
so
− logPU (u)6H(U )− log(1− 
√
c3 − 1) (3)
with probability at least 1− −2.
Combining the bounds in (1) and (3), it follows that
H(X )− H(X |U = u)6H(U )− log(1− 
√
c3 − 1) + r
− 1
with probability at least (1− 2−r)(1− −2)¿ 1− 2−r − −2.
After advantage distilling, let W be a string about which both Alice and Bob have
more information than Eve, V be the summary of Eve’s total knowledge about W and
v be a particular value of V observed by Eve. In the de7nition of smooth entropy and
Theorem 1, PX is replaced by PW | V=v, it is showed that Alice and Bob can agree
an l-bit key K = G(W ) where G is chosen at random from a universal class of hash
functions W→ {0; 1}l,
l= H(W |V = v)− log(m+ 1)− r− 1 − t − 2− s
with probability 1− 2−r − 2−t , and Eve’s information about K6 2−s=ln 2, where s is
the security parameter for smooth entropy.
In Theorem 3, substituting PX and PX |U=u by PW | V=v and PW | V=v;U=u, we have
the conclusion of this paper.
4. Conclusion
Let U be side-information that Eve obtains during information reconciliation, W;U;
K; G be the same as above, then with probability (1−2−r−2−t)(1−2−r−−2), the size
of secret-key distilled by Alice and Bob is H(W |V = v)− log(m+1)− r=(−1)− t−
2− s− + (bits), and Eve’s information about K6 2−s=ln 2, where +=H(U )− log(1−

√
c3 − 1) + r=(− 1); 1¡¡ 2; 1¡c6 3√2; r ¿ 0; t ¿ 0; 16 6 1=√c3 − 1, m
is an integer such that m − log(m + 1)¿ log |X| + t, and s is the security parameter
for smooth entropy.
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